INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF RESULTS
A congestion game is described as follows. The set of players is N s Ä 4 1, . . . , n . There is a finite nonempty set M of facilities. Each player i has a nonempty set of strategies, denoted ⌺ i . Every strategy A i g ⌺ i is a subset of M. With every facility a and every integer 1 F k F n, a real Ž . Ž . number u k is associated, having the interpretation: u k is the utility As i g N : a g A .
Ž .
a The payoff function of player i is defined by i A s u A .
Ž . Ž .
Ž .
Ý a a i agA Congestion games have been used to model such situations as rush hour Ž . traffic the players are drivers, the facilities are road segments , demand Ž for factors of production the players are producers, the facilities are . Ž factors of production , foraging animals the players are animals, the . facilities are foraging sites , etc.
Congestion games were introduced by Rosenthal, who proved the following.
Ž
. T HEOREM Rosenthal, 1973 . E¨ery congestion game possesses a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
Our purpose here is to explore the possibility of replacing a Nash Ž . equilibrium with a strong equilibrium. We recall that Aumann 1959 defined a strong equilibrium as a strategy profile with the property that no coalition of players can deviate in a manner which is profitable to all its Ž . i g N R S chooses A . For a game G, we denote by NE G and SE G the set of Nash equilibria and strong equilibria, respectively. Clearly, Ž . Ž . Ž . SE G : NE G , but the converse is not true, and in fact SE G is often Ž . empty even if mixed strategies are allowed .
Simple examples show that congestion games in general need not Ž possess a strong equilibrium in fact, the well-known prisoner's dilemma . may be obtained as a congestion game . We will identify classes of congestion games which do possess strong equilibria. One restriction which we shall impose is monotonicity. A congestion game is monotone if, for all Ž . Ž . a g M and all integers 1 F k F l F n, we have u k G u l . This is a a a very natural restriction, which reflects the negative effect of congestion. Rosenthal did not impose this requirement, as it was not needed for his theorem. But without monotonicity one cannot expect to guarantee existence of strong equilibria, even in the simplest congestion setup of two players choosing between two facilities. Henceforth, we restrict our attention to monotone congestion games. In Section 2 we observe that if strategies are single facilities then strong equilibria exist. In fact, we prove that if G is a monotone congestion game Ž . Ž . all of whose strategies are singletons, then SE G coincides with NE G ; the latter is nonempty by virtue of Rosenthal's theorem. This result serves as the starting point of our investigation, in which we look for structural properties of the strategy spaces which guarantee the existence of strong equilibria. By a congestion game form we mean a tuple
Ä 4 where N s 1, . . . , n is the set of players, M is the set of facilities, and ⌺ 1 , . . . , ⌺ n are the strategy spaces of the respective players, as in the Ž definition of a congestion game but without the specification of the utility . levels . Given a congestion game form F, one can derive from it a whole Ž . Ž . family of monotone congestion games by assigning monotone utility Ž . levels u k , for a g M and 1 F k F n. All such congestion games are said a to be deri¨ed from F. We say that F is strongly consistent if every monotone congestion game G derived from F possesses a strong equilibrium. We say that F is strong-Nash equi¨alent if every monotone conges-
In this terminology, the result mentioned above states that if
. . , ⌺ is a congestion game form in which the ⌺ consist of Ž singletons only, then F is strong-Nash equivalent and hence, a fortiori, . strongly consistent . It turns out that similar positive results can be obtained when larger sets of facilities are allowed in the strategy spaces, as long as we forbid a certain substructure, which we call a bad configuration. Let ⌺ be a set of strategies on the facility set M. A bad configuration in ⌺ is a tuple
.
and the following relations hold:
Zl x, y s x, y .
Thus, two facilities x, y give rise to a bad configuration if there are strategies in ⌺ which use each one of them without the other, and there is also a strategy in ⌺ which uses both of them. The latter never occurs if ⌺ consists of singletons. We call ⌺ good if it contains no bad configuration. In Section 3 we characterize good strategy sets by means of a certain type of tree-representation that they admit. This representation is very useful in proving our results for good strategy sets in the subsequent sections. It also lends more intuition to the condition ''no bad configuration.'' In view of the tree-representation result, this condition may be understood as an acyclicity condition.
In Section 4 we deal with symmetric congestion game forms. A conges-Ž 1 n .
1 n tion game form F s N, M, ⌺ , . . . , ⌺ is symmetric if ⌺ s иии s ⌺ . In Ž . this case, we abbreviate the notation and write F s N, M, ⌺ , where ⌺ is the common strategy space of the players. We prove that for a symmetric Ž . congestion game form F s N, M, ⌺ with at least two players, the three conditions
i F is strongly consistent,
ii F is strong-Nash equivalent,
Ž .
iii ⌺ is good, are equivalent. This constitutes a complete solution to our problem in the symmetric case. In Section 5 we consider the general case, when the players' strategy Ž 1 n . spaces may be distinct. Let F s N, M, ⌺ , . . . , ⌺ be a congestion game form, and let ⌺ s D n ⌺ i . We prove that if ⌺ is good then F is strongly is1 consistent. But, unlike in the symmetric case, ⌺ being good is neither a sufficient condition nor a necessary one for F to be strong-Nash equivalent.
In Section 6 we demonstrate that the goodness of strategy spaces is instrumental not only in guaranteeing a strong equilibrium but also in establishing some other desirable properties of a Nash equilibrium. The properties that we consider are uniqueness and Pareto optimality.
To conclude the introduction, we mention connections with some recent Ž . related works. Monderer and Shapley 1996 introduced the concept of a potential for a game in normal form. A strategy profile which maximizes Ž the potential is a Nash equilibrium. Hence, any finite potential game i.e., . a game with finite strategy spaces which has a potential possesses a Nash equilibrium. They observed that Rosenthal proved his theorem on congestion games by constructing a potential. Moreover, they proved that every finite potential game is isomorphic to a congestion game, and hence the classes of finite potential games and congestion games coincide. In Section 5 we define the notion of a strong potential for a game in normal form. A strategy profile which maximizes a strong potential is a strong equilibrium.
Hence, any finite strong potential game possesses a strong equilibrium. We prove the main result of Section 5 by showing that, under the assumptions made there, Rosenthal's potential for the congestion game is strong. Ž . Milchtaich 1996 introduced and studied the class of ''congestion games with player-specific payoff functions.'' This class was also investigated, Ž . independently and under different names, by Quint and Shubik 1994 and Ž . by Konishi et al. 1997 . They all proved the existence of a Nash equilibrium for games in this class, and some of these authors even showed the existence of a strong equilibrium. In these games, the utility to a user of a facility depends not only on the facility and the number of users of it, but also on the identity of the user in question. In this sense, they are more general than Rosenthal's congestion games, which are studied here. However, in terms of the strategy spaces, they are more restrictive: only singleton strategies are allowed. Thus the main theme of our workᎏthe dependence of equilibrium properties on the structure of the strategy spacesᎏis not an issue at all in the above-mentioned other works. et al. 1996 considered games which lie in the intersection of Rosenthal's class and Milchtaich's class. They proved the equivalence of Nash and strong equilibria for these games. Under the additional assumption that all players have the same strategy space, they showed that the set Ž . of Nash and strong equilibria coincides with the set of strategy profiles which maximize the potential.
THE CASE OF SINGLETON STRATEGIES
As mentioned above, the case of singleton strategies has been studied by several authors. The following result appears, explicitly or implicitly, in some of these works.
. . , A be a Nash equilibrium. Suppose, for contradiction, that there is a coalition Ž S yS . / S : N that has a profitable deviation to B , A . We claim that the Ž S yS . congestion vectors corresponding to A and to B , A are identical. Indeed, if this is not the case, then since
Ž .
a a a a Ž . here we used monotonicity and the fact that A is a Nash equilibrium . This, however, shows that the deviation is not worthwhile for i. Thus, we Ž . Ž S yS . have proved that A s B , A . It follows that the deviation consists in permuting the choices of the members of S in some way. But then their payoffs undergo the same permutation, which makes it impossible for all of them to gain. B
BAD CONFIGURATIONS AND TREE-REPRESENTATIONS
In this section we consider a set ⌺ of strategies on the facility set M Ž . that is, ⌺ is a set of subsets of M . We recall that ⌺ is said to be good if it Ž . contains no bad configuration see the Introduction .
LEMMA 3.1. Let ⌺ be a good set of strategies on M, and let Z g ⌺. Then there exists z g M such that for all X g ⌺,
. wise there is nothing to prove . We claim that for any X, Y g ⌺ , either
x ,y ;X , Y ,Z is a bad configuration. Thus, the family of intersections Ž . XlZ, for X g ⌺ , forms a finite chain with respect to inclusion. Hence 1 there exists a set X g ⌺ such that
We may choose z g Z R X, and it will satisfy the requirement of the lemma. B
By an M-tree, we shall mean the following:
a tree with a root r, Ž . a labeling of the nodes of the tree except r by elements of M; not all elements of M must appear, but each can appear at most once; a designated subset D of the nodes, which contains all terminal nodes Ž . and possibly other nodes as well .
An example of an M-tree appears in Fig. 1 . Given an M-tree T, we associate with it a set ⌺ of strategies on M, as follows: to each node in D there corresponds a strategy in ⌺ consisting of the labels which appear on the path from r to that node. For instance, if T is the M-tree depicted in Fig. 1 , then
If ⌺ is obtained from T in this way, we say that T is a tree-representation of ⌺.
PROPOSITION 3.2. Let ⌺ be a nonempty set of strategies on M. Then ⌺ is good if and only if it has a tree-representation.
Proof. Suppose first that ⌺ has a tree-representation T. If Ž . x ,y ;X , Y ,Z is a bad configuration in ⌺, then x and y appear on the path in T corresponding to Z. Without loss of generality, we may assume that x precedes y on that path. But then it is impossible for Y to contain y without containing x. This proves that ⌺ is good. < < Suppose next that ⌺ is good. We prove by induction on j ⌺ that ⌺ < < Ä 4 has a tree-representation. If j ⌺ s 0, that is, ⌺ s , then the tree < < which consists of the root alone represents ⌺. Assume then that j ⌺ ) 0. Let Z g ⌺ be maximal with respect to inclusion. Then, according to Lemma 3.1, we can find an element z g M which belongs to Z and to no
Then it is easy to check y y y Ž that ⌺ is good. Let T be a tree-representation of ⌺ which exists by . y the induction hypothesis . Let be the end-node of the path in T Ä 4 corresponding to Z R z . Then we obtain a tree-representation T of ⌺ by adding a new node, pending from , labeling it z, and adding it to the Ž Ä 4 designated subset D itself has to be removed from D, unless Z R z . g ⌺ . B
In the remainder of this section we develop a technique which is based on the tree-representation and will serve us in the following sections. Let
. . , ⌺ be a congestion game form, let A s A , . . . , A Ž S yS . be a strategy profile, and let B , A be another profile where each
For every x g M we define ␦ x as the change in the congestion at x, that is,
egy A i can be written uniquely in the form
where the elements are listed in the order of their appearance on the corresponding path in T, and b is the first element at which the conges-1 tion decreases. That is, Let i g S, and let A s a , . . . , a , b , . . . , b as in 3.1 . Let At this point, we do not know yet that X is a strategy, but ⌬ is defined Ž . anyway it is zero if X f ⌺ . Let be the end-node of Q, and let ␦ be the change in the congestion at the element labeling ; more precisely,
Let C be the set of labels of the nodes which immediately follow in T Ž . C s if is a terminal node . Then simple accounting shows that 
THE SYMMETRIC CASE
In this section we deal with symmetric congestion game forms; this is the case when all players have the same strategy space ⌺. We give a full characterization of strong consistency and of strong᎐Nash equivalence Ž . see the Introduction for definitions in this case. By the results of Section 3, we can find a tree-representation T of ⌺, write A s a , . . . , a , b , . . . , b as in 3.1 , and find a j g S who replaces , chooses B s a , . . . , a , c Proof. Let F be as in the assumptions. We have to exhibit a monotone congestion game G derived from F which has no strong equilibrium. Let Ž . x ,y ;X , Y ,Z be a bad configuration in ⌺. Let G be derived from F by Ž . assigning the utility levels u k , for a g M and 1 F k F n, as follows: A s 2 for all i. Now, if players 1 and 2 deviate to X and Y, respectively, then their payoffs increase to 3 each. Thus, A is not a strong equilibrium. As A was an arbitrary Nash equilibrium, we have proved that G has no strong equilibrium. B Since, by Rosenthal's theorem, strong᎐Nash equivalence implies strong consistency, our two theorems yield the following.
Ž
. C OROLLARY 4.3. Let F s N, M, ⌺ be a symmetric congestion game < < form with N G 2. Then the following three conditions are equi¨alent:
ii F is strong᎐Nash equi¨alent,
The results of this section can be slightly generalized as follows. Let Ž 1 n . F s N, M, ⌺ , . . . , ⌺ be a congestion game form. We say that F is quasi-symmetric if for any two players i and j and any two strategies
Clearly, every symmetric congestion game form is quasi-symmetric, and so is every Ž congestion game form in which all strategies are singletons or the empty . set . Theorems 2.1 and 4.1 have the following common generalization.
. , ⌺ be a quasi-symmetric congestion game form, and let
Theorem 4.2 generalizes as follows. Theorems 4.4 and 4.5 can be proved by adapting the proofs of Theorems 4.1 and 4.2, respectively. We omit the details. 
THE GENERAL CASE
Monderer and Shapley observed that if P is a generalized ordinal poten-Ž . tial in particular, if it is an exact potential for G, then a strategy profile that maximizes P is a Nash equilibrium of G.
We introduce here variants of the notion of potential which are suitable Ž 1 n . for establishing the existence of a strong equilibrium. If A s A , . . . , A is a strategy profile, / S : N is a coalition, and
) A for all i g S. We say that it is a minimal impro¨ement if, in addition, no proper subcoalition of S has an improvement relative to A. A function P:
We note that a strong potential is a generalized strong potential, which in turn is a generalized ordinal potential. The following is obvious.
Obser¨ation 5.1. If P is a generalized strong potential for G, then a strategy profile that maximizes P is a strong equilibrium of G.
Let us return to congestion games. For a congestion game G, Rosenthal defined the function
Ý Ý a agM ks1 Ž He observed that P is an exact potential for G though he did not use this . terminology , thereby proving his existence theorem for the Nash equilibrium. Here we shall prove that, under certain conditions, the same function is a strong potential; existence of a strong equilibrium will follow. Ž . deri¨ed from F, then 5.1 is a strong potential for G.
n . Proof. Let F and G be as in the assumptions. Let A s A , . . . , A g N Ž S yS . ⌺ , and let B , A be a minimal improvement of S relative to A. Ž . Let T be a tree-representation of ⌺ see Proposition 3.2 . Referring to the replacement relation defined in Section 3, it follows from Claim 3.3 and the finiteness of S that there exists a replacement cycle, that is, a sequence i , i , . . . , i of distinct players in S so that i replaces i ; i . allowed: this is the case when i replaces himself. Let us choose a 1 replacement cycle which is as short as possible. To simplify notation, let this cycle be 1, 2, . . . , t. The strategies chosen by these players can be Ž . Ž . written, in accordance with 3.1 and 3.2 , as follows: . For every Ž . x g M, let us denote by ␦ Ј x the change that would occur in the congestion at x, that is,
It follows from the claim that
is an improvement of SЈ relative to A. Since Ž S yS . B , A was assumed to be a minimal improvement, we conclude that Ž . Ž . SЈ s S. Thus, the values of ␦ x are given by 5.2 , and can be used in the following computation.
The inequality follows from monotonicity and the fact that ␦ a G 0.
. Note that ␦ a may equal one this is the case if a g A A l C C and hence The following example shows that the conclusion of strong consistency Ž cannot be sharpened to strong᎐Nash equivalence compare with Theorem . 4.1 in the symmetric case . Ž . The boxes with payoffs 1, 2 and 2, 3 are both Nash equilibria, but only the latter is a strong equilibrium.
We note also that the goodness of the union of the strategy spaces is not a necessary condition for strong consistency, in fact it is not even necessary Ž for strong᎐Nash equivalence compare with Theorem 4.2 in the symmetric . case . A trivial example is when the union of the strategy spaces contains a bad configuration, but each player has just one strategy. Less trivial examples can also be given.
UNIQUENESS AND PARETO OPTIMALITY OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM
First, we consider uniqueness properties of the Nash equilibrium in Ž symmetric congestion games i.e., games in which the players have identi-. cal strategy spaces . If A is a Nash equilibrium of such a game, then any strategy profile obtained from A by permuting the players' strategies is also a Nash equilibrium. In view of this fact, it makes sense to speak of the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium up to permutation.
Furthermore, the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium may fail due to indifference in the choice between strategies. Hence we shall confine attention to generic games. More precisely, let F be a congestion game form and let P P be a property of congestion games. We shall say that a Ž . generic monotone congestion game derived from F has property P P, if Ž . every assignment of monotone utility levels, with the possible exception of assignments which satisfy one of a finite number of linear equations, results in a congestion game that has property P P. In other words, we tolerate exceptions that lie in the union of finitely many hyperplanes in the space of utility levels.
We are now ready to state our result.
Ž . T HEOREM 6.1. Let F s N, M, ⌺ be a symmetric congestion game form. If ⌺ is good, then a generic monotone congestion game deri¨ed from F has a unique Nash equilibrium up to permutation.
We omit the proof, which resembles that of Theorem 4.1. We remark that the assumptions of symmetry and of goodness in the theorem are Ž . essential, as can be shown by suitable generic examples.
Next, we consider Pareto optimality of Nash equilibria. Let G be a congestion game, and let A be a strategy profile in G. We say that A is strictly Pareto optimal if there is no profile B such that Nash equilibrium is weakly Pareto optimal. Therefore, Corollary 4.3 has Ž . the following Pareto optimality analog. Let F s N, M, ⌺ be a symmetric < < congestion game form with N G 2. Then for either of the properties,
Ž . Ž . ii NE G : WPO G , in order for every monotone congestion game G derived from F to have that property, it is necessary and sufficient that ⌺ be good.
For strict Pareto optimality, all of the above still holds true generically; indeed, it can be checked that for any congestion game form F, a generic Ž . Ž . congestion game G derived from F satisfies SE G : SPO G . But if we want to look beyond the generic case, things become less obvious. For Ž . quasi-symmetric congestion game forms see Section 4 we have the following. In the interest of brevity, we omit the proof, which involves a new idea Ž in addition to the tree-representation technique. We remark that a non-. generic example can be given to show that under the conditions of Ž Theorem 6.2 in fact, even under the stronger conditions of singleton . strategies and symmetry , not every strong equilibrium has to be strictly Pareto optimal.
